

THE VICTOR'S VIRTUES: PINDAR, *ISTH.* 1.32 ff.

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Pindar takes his farewell of the mythical theme of Castor and Iolaus and makes a bold announcement, with a personal flourish, of the new theme that will follow.¹ The passage matches formally the announcement of the earlier subject (14–16) and leaves us in no doubt of the importance of what is to be proclaimed. He will invest in song, he says, Poseidon and his sacred places at the holy Isthmus and on the shore by the Copaic lake at Onchestus in Boeotia. He is to tell, in regard to the honours of the victor (τοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς ἐν τιμαῖσιν), of the famous lot that is his father's and of the patrimonial farm-land at Orchomenus. We are launched with these words, in fact, after the praise of the mythical models of chariot-victors, on the praise both of the god of the games and of the status of the victor's family. This will then lead into the praise of the victor himself and culminate in

¹ The relevant bibliography of the passage includes the following: F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880) 306–12, J. B. Bury, *The Isthmian Odes of Pindar* (London 1892) 1 ff., C. Gaspar, *Essai de chronologie pindarique* (Brussels 1900) 150 ff., J. Sandys, *The Odes of Pindar* (London 1919²) 436 ff., U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 330–35, A. Puech, *Pindare* 4 vols. in various editions (Paris 1922–1967) 4.15 ff., L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar 2: Critical Commentary* (London 1932) 334 ff., G. Norwood, "Two Notes on Pindar, *Isthmian* I and VII," *AJP* 63 (1942) 460–61, especially 460, R. Lattimore, *The Odes of Pindar* (Chicago 1947) 130 ff., B. A. van Groningen, *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque in Verhand. d. kon. Ned. Akad. v. Wetensch. afd. Letterk.* n.r. 65.2 (1958) 375–85, E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica 2: The First Isthmian Ode in Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Phil.* 18.2 (1962), G. Méautis, *Pindare le dorien* (Paris 1962) 268–75, O. Werner, *Pindar: Siegesgesänge und Fragmente* (Munich 1967) 292 ff., E. Thummer, *Pindar: Die isthmischen Gedichte* 2 vols. (Heidelberg 1968–1969), C. M. Bowra, *The Odes of Pindar* (London 1969) 141 ff., G. S. Conway, *The Odes of Pindar* (London 1972) 231 ff., J. Péron, *Les images maritimes de Pindare* (Paris 1974) 315–20, R. A. Swanson, *Pindar's Odes* (Indianapolis 1974) 181 ff., G. A. Privitera, "Lettura della prima *Istmica* di Pindaro," *QUCC* 28 (1978) 97–134, "Due Note alla prima *Istmica* di Pindaro," *Studi in onore di Anthos Ardizzoni* 1 (Rome 1978) 723–34, and "A proposito di Pind. 'Istm.' I 25," *GIF* n.s. 9 (1978) 267, V. Schmidt, "Zu Pindar," *Glotta* 53 (1975) 36–43, W. J. Slater, "Doubts about Pindaric Interpretation," *CJ* 72 (1977) 193–208, especially 199 and note 34, and F. J. Nisetich, *Pindar's Victory Songs* (Baltimore 1980) 293–97. References, when made here to these works, may be to the name of the author only.

the catalogue of his victories (52 ff.), which were won by the grace of the god, whether worshipped at the panhellenic sanctuary at the Isthmus or at the local shrine nearer home. The mention of the father's lot and estate is introduced here, it is explicitly stated, with a view to honouring the son, whose praises are to follow, just as the poet had said, in introducing the preceding mythical passage, that he would set the victor's theme to the Castor-song, or to an air of Iolaus. This fact has a bearing on the interpretation of the lines (32–40):

- χαίρετ'. ἐγὼ δὲ Ποσειδάωνι Ἴσθμῳ τε ζαθέα
 Ὀρχηστίασιν τ' αἰόνεσσι περιστέλ-
 λων αἰοδᾶν
 γάρυσσμαι τοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς ἐν τιμαῖσιν ἀγακλέα τὰν Ἀ-
 σωποδώρου πατρὸς αἴσαν
- 35 Ἐρχομενοῖό τε πατρῶν ἄρουραν,
 ἃ νῦν ἔρειδόμενον ναυαγίαις
 ἐξ ἀμετρήτας ἄλδς ἐν κρυόεσσα
 δέξατο συντυχία·
 νῦν δ' αὖτις ἀρχαίας ἐπέβασε πότμος
- 40 συγγενὴς εὐαμερίας· ὁ πονη-
 σαις δὲ νόφ καὶ προμάθειαν φέρει·

For us the reference of *νῦν* in line 36 may be at first sight uncertain, even if it is finally made clear by reflection. For Pindar's original audience it was, of course, immediately evident because their acquaintance with the family's history left them in no doubt to whom allusion was being made. For us analysis is necessary because of the defects in our understanding, as it is recommended because of our activities as scholarly interpreters. But this has no implications for the perspicuity or immediacy of the poem itself. It is a manifest instance, though shrouded in obscurity from some of our critics, of the historical relativity of our judgments in reading Greek poetry.

νῦν has been commonly taken to refer to the father, Asopodorus, but in antiquity Didymus, though he seems to have followed this interpretation (Schol. Inscr. a: 3.196 Drachmann), noted that the reference might as well be to Herodotus himself (52b: 3.205 Drachmann), and recently C. M. Bowra, E. Thummer, and G. A. Privitera have preferred this latter reading of the line. I believe that the traditional interpretation is correct. Formally, this is shown by the parallel between the introduction, at lines 14–16, of the charioteer's hymn and that, at lines 32–34, of the praise of the father's fame and wealth. In each case the poet indicates that he is to adapt the theme to his purpose of praising the victor. It is, when this is observed, easy to read lines 36 ff. as that adaptation, whereby the restoration of the father's prosperity is attributed to the grace of the family's Fate, as evidenced in the victory at the games. Some other considerations point to the same conclusion.

First, the passage is an instance of a well-known component of an epinician ode, the praise of father and family.² In this case, as in some others, the theme is the constancy, in vicissitude, of the paternal or familial career. That is represented here by the "glorious fortune of the father, Asopodorus," or, more concretely, by the wealth of "the patrimonial estate at Orchomenus." For the latter had served as the agent of the former by giving refuge to Asopodorus, when it received him, in a chilling state, after he had been cast adrift on shattered wreckage upon the unbounded sea. But now the family's Good Fortune has "set his foot again on the shore of their fair weather of old."³ It is agreed that the intervention of the Πότμος συγγενής figures the chariot-victory of Herodotus. If the victory is so described, the victor appears as the bearer of the family's fate, so that the praise of the father's emergence from the flood of vicissitude redounds to the credit of the son, just as the poet had promised (33).

Secondly, the reference of the shipwreck mentioned in lines 35–37 has been put in doubt. Mezger, Bury, and Farnell, following a view expressed in the scholia, take the description as literal. But Pindaric contrasts of storm and calm, which are regularly symbolic, are evidence against this view, as is the reference in lines 38–39 to the action of the family's fate, which forms part of the image, for this must be a figurative allusion to the victory. Moreover, a reader determined to find a literal interpretation in the context, if he had the map of Boeotia before him, showing Orchomenus on the shore of the Copaic lake but at a distance from the sea, must have been led to suppose that the castaway Asopodorus who was received hospitably, in a freezing condition, by the estate at Orchomenus had just survived a shipwreck on the waters of the lake nearby, which were in that case given a much-exaggerated description as "the unbounded sea."⁴ It seems clear that Pindar's parallels and the necessities of interpretation compel a metaphorical reading, as Bundy (48–51) and Péron have most recently argued.

² See Thummer 1.49–54.

³ On the metaphorical use of ἐπέβασε . . . ἐναμείας with other nouns of similar meaning, see M. L. West on Hes. *Theog.* 396 in his commentary on the poem (Oxford 1966).

⁴ I take the epithet ἀμέτρητος in association with the following κρυόεσσα. The infinite sea, when it surrounds and confronts a man, becomes a symbol of his own ἀμηχανία, with a chilling effect. Cf. however the interpretations of A. S. F. Gow, ΜΕΤΡΑ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΗΣ, *CR* 45 (1931) 10–12, A. Y. Campbell, "Herodotus 1.47 and Theocritus *Id.* XVI.60," *CR* 45 (1931) 117–18, and "ΜΕΤΡΑ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΗΣ and ΚΥΜΑΤΑ ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ," *CR* 46 (1932) 203, Péron 317, and M. L. West on Hes. *Op.* 648 in his commentary on the poem (Oxford 1978). The marked symmetries of the contrast in 36–40 between the two states (the reception of the shipwrecked father and the setting ashore, the disaster and the familial Fate, the chill overwhelming and the fair weather of old) suggest strongly that, as the latter occasion (39–40) is figurative, so also is the former (36–38). Péron 315–16 comments appositely on the literal interpretation: "Orchomène n'est pas au bord de la mer, et l'on voit mal, dans ces conditions, comment Asôpodôre aurait pu y faire naufrage."

If the shipwreck is a metaphor and Asopodorus is the subject of it, it is, on the whole, most probable that the reverse signified was of a political kind. It has been shown that, in other instances of the metaphorical contrast between storm and calm, Pindar regularly praises an athletic success that retrieves a political or military failure.⁵ This interpretation is especially appropriate here, if the father Asopodorus is the same person as the soldier of that name, the son of Timander, who commanded the Theban cavalry at Plataea and wreaked havoc upon the Megarians and Phliasians in the battle (Hdt. 9.69).⁶ If Asopodorus of Thebes escaped the vengeance that Pausanias inflicted on the leading Medisers (Hdt. 9.88), he may have had to flee, as a Scholiast suggests, to his family-estate at Orchomenus. It is true that his name does not seem likely to have been very rare in Boeotia (*RE* is able to identify six men who bore it in Greek history), but the likelihood that there were two prominent, land-holding, horse-raising Boeotians of this name who suffered misfortune at this period is not so large as to overthrow the identification.

This combination, of a political reference with identification of the Mediser, is more likely than the alternative, which finds a reference to a failure in athletic competition. "Shipwreck" is, to be sure, sometimes found as a metaphor in such a context in Greek,⁷ and the Scholiast (88c: 3.210 Drachmann) reports that some found in line 63 an allusion to a defeat at Nemea, apparently by an inference from the poet's silence concerning that festival at line 65.⁸ It is true also that the disgrace

⁵ See Bundy 48–52 and Péron.

⁶ The identification was accepted, e.g., by Gaspar 151–52, R. W. Macan, *Herodotus: The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Books* (London 1908) 1.2.741, Sandys 436, Wilamowitz 331, Farnell 2.334, W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* 2 (Oxford, repr. 1936) 316, J. H. Finley, Jr. in *HSCP* 68 (1958) 124–25, van Groningen 377, note 6, A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London 1960) 537, C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964) 410, Privitera in *QUCC* 28 (1978) 113–14, 133–34. The identification has been attacked particularly by Bundy 48 and note 39, who wrote, "the identification, even as a guess, is unsound, since it poses several problems and solves none," but he does not offer specific arguments. Bundy is followed by Thummer 2.8. Privitera 113–14 seeks to support the identification by the evidence of structure, notably by the parallel between the relationship of Heracles to Castor and Iolaus and that of Asopodorus to Herodotus, and by the military allusions in the earlier part of the poem.

⁷ In particular, the metaphor may signify the wreck of a chariot, as in Soph. *El.* 730 and [Dem.] 61.29. Cf. *Pyth.* 5.34, 49–51 for an allusion to a smash worthy of the metaphor.

⁸ Bundy 74 finds the alleged allusion "a foolish guess" and goes on to argue, on grounds of formal parallels, that the sentiment expressed in 63 is the equivalent of the idea (*Nem.* 10.20) that *κόπος* (of the audience) is troublesome to deal with. Queen Victoria, it is true, is said to have been especially pleased by short sermons, but *τὸ σεσωπαμένον* here appears to go beyond the brevity of the form, which was given expression in *βραχὺ μέτρον ἔχων ὕμνος*, to the passing over in silence of something that might have been said as (e.g.) in *Ol.* 9.104 ff., *Nem.* 5.16 ff., and fr. 180.1 (Snell-Maehler). Cf. also Privitera 129, note 54, and Bundy 2.73 ff.

incurred by a notable failure in competition is only the reverse side of the high value attributed to victory, and Pindar more than once paints a grim picture of the fate of the defeated competitors. At line 65, in the course of his catalogue of victories, he is very likely to be referring to some incident at the games, too well-known to be passed over but too depreciatory to be plainly described, and to be following the aristocratic rule of putting the best face on things by turning the worn side of a garment in and the good side out (*Pyth.* 3.83). It is possible, and economical, to suppose that the reference of 65 is the same as that of 34–37, but the combined weight of the parallel uses of the contrast of storm and calm and of the historical probabilities turns the balance the other way.

Finally, Pindar's contrast in the passage is not simple. In addition to the image of retrieval of the shipwrecked fortune, there is present also the comparison between the reception, in ill fortune, by the patrimonial farm-lands and the restoration, by the Πότμος συγγενής, of a pristine prosperity. This comparison, though it alludes to a contrast in fortunes, presumably between father and son, imagines for us also the picture of the staunchness of the family's φνᾶ, steadfast and succouring in adversity, triumphant and transforming in victory. That Pindar has chosen to combine in this way the image of the loyalty of the family's φνᾶ with that of the vicissitudes of its members offers confirmation that it is indeed Asopodorus who is here signified by νῦν and is the chief subject of lines 35–37. Momentarily the victor recedes behind the figure of the Πότμος συγγενής, whom he has inherited from his father and all his forebears, and whose intervention he had enacted on the race-course at the Isthmus. The poet has raised his voice, as he had promised, in honour of the victor by praising the distinguished station and inherited farm-lands of his father, which have been the support of the family in good times and in bad.

Although Poseidon is not mentioned in 35–40, we read there, as Professor E. Robbins points out to me, of two events that seem to belong to his element, for Herodotus is set on a safe shore, while his father Asopodorus is brought safe to land from a stormy sea. But we had read just before (32 ff.) that the poet is to praise Poseidon of the Isthmus and of Onchestus, the one the site of the victory that brought Herodotus ashore in fair weather, the other not far from the hospitable estate at Orchomenus that received the shipwrecked father. If Poseidon acts here both as the giver of the victory and as the provider of calm, we are reminded of his performance of that double function at *Isth.* 7.37–39, where also the fair weather (εὐδία) vouchsafed by the god is metaphorical.

Pindar makes at line 40 an easy, gliding transition by the use of a maxim (ὁ πονήσας δὲ νόῳ καὶ προμάθειαν φέρει), as he turns to the praise of the victories of Herodotus and away from that of the retrieval of the family's fortunes. His manner here is in strong contrast with his introduction (at 14 ff. and 32 ff.) of the mythical theme and of the victor's theme.

Instead of another such sharp break, he provides a piece of traditional wisdom which, as it is connected by linking δὲ's, before and behind, with the context in which it is set, has reference both to what precedes and to what follows. We are justified then in seeing here, not a new theme, but a continuation of what had gone before. The maxim continues the subject of troubles, while turning away from that of inheritance, to which deference has now been paid.⁹ The generalising ὁ πονήσας is easily understood as transitional, because of its relation to Herodotus, who drove his own chariot, as well as to Asopodorus, who suffered "shipwreck," but πόνοι are now to be given a new bearing, in their relation to human forethought, though it is not well understood what that bearing is and the sense of the maxim is variously explained.

The syntax and meaning of the dative νόω are obviously crucial. To begin with, it should be observed that between it and the preceding πονήσας there must be thought to exist a mutual repulsion. For πόνος in Pindar is likely to imply a pain, punishment, hardship, endurance, testing, enmity, danger, necessity, and especially athletic effort. It signifies a brute and troublesome fact, which is hardly to be reconciled with the reasonableness of νόος.¹⁰ In traditional Greek thought hard knocks are opposed to learning and understanding, forming the schooling only of fools.¹¹ A compact phrase such as ὁ πονήσας νόω would be a powerful oxymoron, more worthy of a sophist's rhetoric than of the poetic tradition. We shall fail to find its like elsewhere in Pindar¹² and should

⁹ Cf. however Bundy 52, 54, who appears to recognise the maxim only as the conclusion of the preceding passage, in which the promise of γάρυσσμαι of 34 is fulfilled, and to find a sharp break at 41. This interpretation seems to miss the significance of what follows ὁ πονήσας and the successive instances of δέ.

¹⁰ Pindar is able, however, to speak of glory as the result of πόνοι (e.g., *Paeans* 2.66 ὁ δὲ καλὸν τι πονήσας εὐαγορίας φλέγει and cf. *Ol.* 6.11, 11.4, *Pyth.* 8.73 and 10.42). And he admits πόνος of the performance of the poem, with music, song and dance (e.g., *Nem.* 3.12, *Paeans* 7b.22, *Dith.* 3.16 [Snell-Maehler]). These signify the precious outcome of πόνοι, but a more intimate relation between them and the values of the mind is lacking.

¹¹ Cf. *Hom. Il.* 17.32 = 20.198 ῥέχθεν δέ τι νήπιος ἔγνω, *Hes. Op.* 218, with the note of M. L. West in his edition of the poem (Oxford 1978).

¹² Privitera 117–18 translates, "chi affronta travagli con discernimento," and finds in the maxim of line 40 the explanation of the reversal of fortune described in the lines that precede. But the notion of handling πόνοι with νόος is not shown to be Pindaric, and the sentiment that prudence in difficulties produces or carries forethought with it ("porta in sé") is not impressive. Privitera's paraphrase ("chi agisce con discernimento mostra di possedere già la saggezza") seeks to find in the passage an allusion to an inborn capacity to foresee the consequences of actions. But, even if this idea could be thought to be implicit in the maxim, it would make an unlikely explanation of the reversal just mentioned, for the responsibility is there explicitly attributed to the Πότμος συγγενής, not to the victor's natural prudence in troubles. For Privitera (121 and note 39) Herodotus is the subject of the whole passage from line 34 to line 51. Van Groningen 377, 383 inclines to a similar understanding of νόω ("qui fait des efforts avec intelligence") and to the assumption that Asopodorus is congratulated on his prudence in maintaining a refuge at Orchomenus for himself in his time of troubles and

therefore reject such versions as those of Lattimore ("the man who has had labor of mind"), of Nisetich ("and suffering brings the sufferer's mind foreknowledge"), of Werner ("Wer die Not zwang mit Verstand, bringt als Frucht Erfahrung ein"), and of H. Dörrie ("Wer mit Verstand sich müht, trägt als Lobe *προμήθεια* davon").¹³ *νόω* stands in semantic opposition to what precedes and looks forward to what follows.

The dative has been taken as an indirect object or dative of reference, as in Puech's "Les épreuves donnent à l'esprit de l'homme la prévoyance," or in a local sense, as by Sandys' "Yet he, who hath suffered troubles, winneth forethought also in his heart," or as instrumental, in Conway's "has learnt to see with the clear eyes of wisdom." However, the thought that *πόνοι* are productive of *προμάθεια* (as represented in Swanson's "suffering contributes prudence to the mind") seems quite unpindaric and should be rejected out of hand. The general Greek view is that those who undergo the hard trials of experience acquire afterthought (*ἐπιμήθεια*), not forethought (*προμήθεια*), and it is precisely the virtue of the latter that it obviates the necessity, which is otherwise unavoidable, of learning by bitter experience, which was the fate of the great sinner, Ixion. It is *νόος* that generates *προμάθεια* by directing attention to the goal of *κέρδος*. It is not therefore satisfactory to find here an instance of the familiar tragic *πάθει μάθος*, as is done by Bury and Thummer,¹⁴ after a suggestion in the scholia. That suffering may be necessary and that the gods may see us through it Pindar is abundantly aware, but he ascribes no moral or spiritual advantage to it directly.¹⁵ *πόνοι*, though they may serve as a challenge for *τόλμα*, can by themselves produce no more than painful hindsight, including the sense of advantages missed. The praise of a victor and his family illuminates their ability, by an inherited grace, to rise superior to trials and misfortunes.¹⁶ It has nothing to say of a purity or prudence that is produced by suffering.

a breeding-farm to support the racing-ventures of his son. Bury 6–7 had seen a compliment to Asopodorus in his observance of measure and a possible warning to Herodotus against the danger of driving his own chariot.

¹³ H. Dörrie, *Leid und Erfahrung in Abhandl. d. Akad. d. Wiss. u. d. Lit.* Mainz, geistes-u. sozialwiss. Kl. (1956) nr. 5, 317.

¹⁴ So van Groningen 377 and perhaps also Bundy, who speaks (52 and note 44) of "the value of bitter experience."

¹⁵ Cf. however Dörrie (above, note 13) 318, who writes, "freiwillig geleistete Mühe führt auch innerlich weiter, sie verleiht jene Fähigkeit der klugen Vorausschau-*προμήθεια*, die denn zum sichtbaren Erfolg führt."

¹⁶ Typical of the Pindaric view is *Nem.* 10.30 οὐδ' ἀμόχθω καρδίᾳ προσφέρων τόλμαν. When his heart is buffeted by troubles and difficulties, the victor brings fortitude against them. Cf. *Isth.* 4.45–47.

The nearest Pindaric parallels are *Pyth.* 3.103 εἰ δὲ νόῳ τις ἔχει θνατῶν ἀλαθείας ὁδόν and 6.47 νόῳ δὲ πλοῦτον ἄγει.¹⁷ In other poets it is well to remember Nausicaa's control of her mule-team (*Od.* 6.320) νόῳ δ' ἐπέβαλλον ἱμάσθλην, "she used the whip with skill and judgment" (with "know-how"). The common significance of the form νόῳ in these passages is the control or guidance of a skill or understanding. This sense is appropriate also in our passage, which should therefore be translated accordingly: "Though he has gone through troubles (which are traditionally productive of afterthought), if a man have the guidance of understanding, he can produce even forethought."¹⁸ Pindar is so far from thinking that πόνοι produce forethought *simpliciter* that he says instead that they may be compatible with its attainment,¹⁹ provided that νόος shows the way. The maxim thus marks the ode's transition from the difficulties that have been endured by the victor in his car and survived by the father in his career to the forethought that is now publicly displayed in the celebration of the victory.

After his transition the poet continues in a general vein:

ὁ πονή-
σαις δὲ νόῳ καὶ προμάθειαν φέρει·
εἰ δ' ἄρετᾶ κατάκειται πᾶσαν ὀργάν,
ἀμφοτέρων δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις,
χρή νυν εὐρόντεσσιν ἀγάνορα κόμπων
μὴ φθονεραῖσι φέρειν
45 γνῶμαις.

ἀρετᾶ, which was preferred by Aristarchus and occurs as a correction in the Vaticanus Graecus 1312, is certainly correct, though the variants ἀρετά and ἀρεταί appear elsewhere in text and scholia. κατάκειται, which is unanimously attested,²⁰ is difficult, because of the lack of close parallels for the usage.²¹ ἔγκειμαι, which is twice found in Pindar, seems nearest, in

¹⁷ For the mind as moral guide, cf. also *Isth.* 3.2 κατέχει φράσιν αἰανὴ κόρον.

¹⁸ The translation obviates the objection that νόῳ is made redundant if brought into association with προμάθειαν. The objection has often been raised, most recently by Thummer 2.23 and Privitera 117.

¹⁹ On πόνος as a pre-condition of success, cf. *Ol.* 10.20–22, *Nem.* 9.44 and fr. 227 Snell-Maehler.

²⁰ A. J. Beattie, "Pindar, *Isthmia* i.41," *CR* n.s. 3 (1953) 77–79, condemned the reading, conjectured κατατάκει, and rendered the text, "if by prowess he obliterates every passion." The conjecture attributes to the poet what appears to be a quite un-Pindaric idea, that ἀρετά can "melt" or "obliterate" ὀργά. He finds also in ὀργάν "the obvious reference to the hostility which a disgraceful act rouses in the minds of other people," but he does not offer evidence that ὀργά in Pindar signifies such hostility, nor that it is removed by ἀρετά. For other emendations, see D. E. Gerber, *Emendations in Pindar 1513–1972* (Amsterdam 1976) 130.

²¹ For a discussion of the passage, with a review of some proposed translations, see Thummer on 41–45.

the sense "to be devoted to" (*Parth.* 2.36–37), or "to be planted" (*Paeans* 2.52, with or without an erotic implication²²). *πρόσκειμαι* also takes the sense "to be devoted to" (LSJ s.v. II.2) but is not found so used in the poets. The construction, *πολὺς ἔγκειμαι*, which occurs in prose in the sense "to be insistent, or vehement," is helpful in the interpretation of *πᾶσαν ὀργάν*.²³ An analogous case, in different images, is offered by Pindar's figurative use of *χέομαι* (*Isth.* 1.4: *Δᾶλον ἐν ᾧ κέχυμαι*), *προσέχομαι* (*Pyth.* 6.50–51: *τίν τ', Ἐλέλιχθον Ποσειδάν, προσέχεται*), and *τρέπω* (*Ol.* 4.16: *πρὸς ἡσυχίαν φιλόπολιν καθαρᾷ γνώμα τετραμμένον*. Cf. *Isth.* 5.22–23).

About the text we cannot be certain, but this passage appears to be a case in which we are more troubled by the poet's words than by his meaning and intention.²⁴ I guess that *κατάκειται* is, in origin, the passive or medio-passive, of *κατατίθημι/κατατίθεμαι* (as *κείμαι* often of the simple *τίθημι*²⁵) in the sense "pay down," "deposit," or "invest" (so LSJ s.v. *κατάκειμαι* 9²⁶). If considered in this light, and within the relations of Pindar's context, the word appears to be translated satisfactorily as "paid into," "invested," or "committed."²⁷ *πᾶσαν ὀργάν* then signifies that the commitment is passionate and unreserved.²⁸ The man has, as we say, "put everything" into excelling.²⁹ Boeckh then had the root of the matter when he translated, "si quis virtuti omnibus modis incumbit et operam dat." A similar sense is obtained, if we can assume a transitive *κατακείσθαι*, on the analogy of *παρακείσθαι* in texts from papyri, and take *ὀργάν* as object of the verb.³⁰

²² See the discussion in S. L. Radt, *Pindars Zweiter und Sechster Paian* (Amsterdam 1958) 52–53.

²³ Cf. also Theocr. 3.33; and the note *ad loc.* by A. S. F. Gow in his commentary (Cambridge 1950).

²⁴ We are in a similar case in regard to *ἐν ᾧ κέχυμαι* in 4.

²⁵ *είσκειμαι* is used as the passive of *εἰστίθημι* by Thucydides (6.31) and *ἔγκειμαι* as a passive by Plato, *Crat.* 402e and *Rep.* 10:616d. Cf. also Archil. fr. 115.2 IEG *Λεωφίλω πάντα κείται* for the passive of the simple verb and a like general sense.

²⁶ So also R. Renehan, *Greek Textual Criticism: A Reader* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969) 111–12.

²⁷ Farnell 2.339, comparing *Nem.* 4.52, of the slope of mountains, renders, "if he inclines with all his soul to the pursuit of honour." Privitera 118 has "se poi egli insiste con tutta l'indole nella virtù," deriving from the same passage the notion of standing firm.

²⁸ The accusative then signifies a locus in the Pindaric psychology. Cf. *Pyth.* 2.74, *Nem.* 9.27, *Isth.* 4.46, 8.5 and 26 (*θυμόν*); *Ol.* 1.41 (*φρένα*); *Pyth.* 1.95 (*νόον*); *Isth.* 4.54 (*ψυχάν*); *Isth.* 2.35 (*ὀργάν*).

²⁹ Bundy 57, note 52, compares *Isth.* 5.24–25 *εἰ δὲ τέτραπται / θεοδότων ἔργων κέλευθον ἂν καθάραν*. Fennell, *ad loc.*, quotes from Xen. *De ven.* 10.8 *ᾧ γὰρ ἂν προσπέσῃ, εἰς τοῦτον τὴν ὀργὴν κατέθετο*, of the rage of the wild boar. Cf. also *Pyth.* 4.295 *θυμὸν ἔκδοσθαι πρὸς ἡβαν*.

³⁰ So V. Schmidt 36 ff.

The complete commitment to ἀρετά is surely the mark of the forethought just mentioned at the end of the preceding sentence, and the reference to πόνοι, which follows immediately, corresponds chiasmatically with ὁ πονήσας at the beginning of the same sentence.

πόνοι and δαπάναι are a *cliché* of Pindar's epinician verse, and presumably of the *genre* itself, though appropriate in an ode for a victor who drove his own chariot.³¹ The pain and labour of training and competition and the expense incurred in taking part in the games and in celebrating victories are frequently mentioned as conditions required of the victor.³² They are not, to be sure, sufficient to produce the glory of victory, but this cannot be achieved without them. In this connection *Isth.* 6.10–13 is illuminating:

εἰ γάρ τις ἀνθρώπων δαπάνῃ τε χαρεῖς
καὶ πόνῳ πράσσει θεοδμάτων ἀρετάς,
σύν τέ οἱ δαίμων φυτεύει
δόξαν ἐπήρατον, ἐσχατιαῖς ἤδη πρὸς ὄλβον
βάλλετ' ἄγκυραν θεότιμος ἑών.

The man undertakes expense and effort for the sake of excellence, while the divinity offers fame. The man of whom this is said, Pindar continues, has attained the greatest of blessings.

πόνοι and δαπάναι are intrinsically painful, damaging, and disadvantageous, as is shown by many indications, but notably by the recompense that victory and its celebration are said to offer. This may be said to take the form of a requital (ἀμοιβή), reward (ἄποινα, πονιά), forgetfulness (λάθα), or respite (ἄμνησα).³³ More specifically, pain may be ended (*Nem.* 8.49–50) or healed (*Nem.* 3.17–18), healing and enchantment may soothe (*Nem.* 4.1–3), or there may be a deliverance (λύτρον, λυτήριον) from πόνοι and δαπάναι (*Pyth.* 5.106, *Isth.* 8.1).³⁴ It is in spite of this fact that Pindar twice permits himself an expression such as δαπανᾷ τε χαρεῖς / καὶ πόνῳ, in order to praise the eagerness of a victor to enter the competition.³⁵ But this is a powerful shorthand, devised to refer to a situation in which the demonstration, by victory, of human excellence is the goal, as in *Isth.* 6.10–11 above or in *Ol.* 8.4–7:

εἴ τι ν' ἔχει λόγον ἀνθρώπων πέρι
μαιομένων μεγάλαν
ἀρετὴν θυμῷ λαβεῖν,
τῶν δὲ μόχθων ἀμνησάν·

³¹ See, e.g., *Ol.* 5.15–16, 11.4, *Isth.* 5.56–58, 6.10–11, and Slater, *Lex. Pind.* s. vv.

³² See, e.g., *Ol.* 10.22, *Pyth.* 12.28–29. More generally, see *Pyth.* 3.110–11 for the connection between πλοῦτος and κλέος for the future.

³³ *Nem.* 5.48, 7.16, 1.70, *Ol.* 8.7.

³⁴ Cf. *Nem.* 7.74 εἰ πόνος ἦν, τὸ τερπνὸν πλέον πεδέρχεται.

³⁵ *Isth.* 6.10–11, 4.29.

What is truly desired in the heart, it here appears, is great ἀρετά and respite from toil.

What the athlete must do is, not to find immediate pleasure in physical competition and the expenditure of money, but to keep his heart high, so as to override toil (*Pyth.* 9.31a–32). It is his ambition for victory, not his lust for competition, which will, at the price of πόνοι, bring him upon fame (fr. 227 Snell-Maehler). There is a disposition that is appropriate to this desire to compete amid πόνοι, and it is fortitude (τόλμα, which Pindar compares with the spirit of lions: *Isth.* 4.45).³⁶ It must be an implication of the Pindaric context, in the transitional passage of the First Isthmian, that this virtue of will and habit is attributed to Herodotus by contrast with the more rational forethought that will be celebrated in what follows.

We are now in a position to understand why ἀμφοτέρων δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις stands in apposition to πᾶσαν ὀργάν.³⁷ In Pindar ὀργά is, more or less, “temper,” which may take various forms. There is great-heartedness (μεγαλήτορος ὀργά at *Isth.* 5.34), affability (ὀργὰν γλυκεῖαν at *Isth.* 2.35), αἰδὼς (μείλιχος ὀργά at *Pyth.* 9.43),³⁸ a just disposition (θεμισσαμένους ὀργάς at *Pyth.* 4.141), and even, it would seem, a Bacchic frenzy (ἐν ὀργαῖς Βακχίαις at fr. 70b. 20 Snell-Maehler). Once (at *Nem.* 5.32; cf. *Pyth.* 11.22–23) it comes close to “anger,” which is later to become its usual meaning. On three occasions it signifies the temper that is appropriate to δαπάναι and πόνοι. Thus we find at *Isth.* 6.10–16:

- 10 εἰ γάρ τις ἀνθρώπων δαπάνᾳ τε χαρεῖς
καὶ πόνῳ πράσσει θεοδμάτων ἀρετάς,
σύν τέ οἱ δαίμων φυτεύει
δόξαν ἐπήρατον, ἐσχατιαῖς ἤδη πρὸς ὄλβον
βάλλετ' ἄγκυραν θεότιμος ἑών.
τοιαῖσιν ὀργαῖς εὐχεται
15 ἀντιάσαις αἰδαν γῆράς τε δέξασθαι πολὺν
ὁ Κλεονίκου παῖς·

The ὀργαί are evidently the man's disposition to compete for ἀρεταί in δαπάναι and πόνοι, and the daimon's disposition to grant fame. Similarly, at *Pyth.* 1.89, in a passage in which Pindar reminds Hieron of his high place in the city and encourages him to maintain it by great expenditure, he bids his patron maintain his disposition for magnificence, εὐανθεῖ . . . ἐν ὀργᾷ παρμένων. Finally, in another poem for Hieron, at *Pyth.* 2.76–77,

³⁶ On τόλμα as the virtue of rugged endurance through effort, cf. *Pyth.* 10.23–24 δὲ ἂν χερσὶν ἢ ποδῶν ἀρετᾷ κρατήσῃς τὰ μέγιστ' ἀέθλων ἔλη τόλμα τε καὶ σθένει and *Nem.* 10.30 (above, note 16). Cf. also *Pyth.* 5.117, *Nem.* 11.30–32, *Isth.* 8.11.

³⁷ On the collocation of accusative and dative in such phrases, see R. Renehan in *CP* 75 (1980) 245–46.

³⁸ See my interpretation of *Pyth.* 9.43 in *TAPA* 103 (1972) 568–69.

the poet speaks to the ruler of a great social evil, the purveyors of slander, whom he compares in temper (*ὀργαῖς*) with vixen. But the fox, it appears from the following lines (78 ff.; cf. 90 ff.), though devoted to gain, fails to grasp where his true profit lies.³⁹ His narrow view of profit is likely to be just a lack of the forethought of the First Isthmian. If so, it is appropriate that this too should be called *ὀργαί*.

The *πᾶσα ὀργά* that the man commits to *ἀρετά*, it now appears, embraces the dispositions that are appropriate to the *πόννοι* and *δαπάναι* of the competitor, especially if he enters and drives a chariot, and these are fortitude (*τόλμα*) and forethought (*προμάθεια*).⁴⁰ They are found as a pair elsewhere in Pindar, notably in fr. 231 Snell-Maehler, *τόλμα τέ μιν ζαμενῆς και σύνεσις πρόσκοπος ἐσάωσεν*, and *Nem.* 7.58–60, which says of the activity of Moira:

Θεαρίων, τὶν δ' εἰκότα καιρὸν ὄλβου
δίδωσι, τόλμαν τε καλῶν ἀρομένῳ
σύνεσιν οὐκ ἀποβλάπτει φρενῶν.

Fortitude, though not mentioned, is implied in *Isth.* 1.40, for it must, on the Pindaric view, have been exhibited in the endurance of misfortunes before the restoration of prosperity by the faithful fortune of the family and in the stress of driving and winning in the games. Forethought on the other hand is emphasized in the same passage by the use of *καί* and by being named explicitly, and must have seemed evident in the occasion of the poem, the celebration of the Isthmian victory with the chariot.⁴¹

After the conditional clause describing the victor's virtues, the poet continues our passage by introducing the theme of the duty of generous praise (43–46):⁴²

³⁹ On the Pindaric view of wealth and profit, see *TAPA* 99 (1968) 537–39. Cf. also P. R. Colace, "Considerazioni sul concetto di ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ in Pindaro," *Studi in onore di Anthos Ardizzoni* 2 (Rome 1978) 737–45.

⁴⁰ Cf. the connection between *δαπάναι* and *ἐλπίς* at *Isth.* 5.57–58. But *προμάθεια*, unlike *ἐλπίς*, directs a man to the limited end of a true and measured profit (*Nem.* 11.44–48).

⁴¹ A comparable pair of dispositions is indicated at *Isth.* 4.45–47, where the *τόλμα* of lions is set beside the *μητις* of foxes. Cf. also *Pyth.* 5.109–17, where the victor's *θάρσος* and *τόλμα* are mentioned along with other dispositions, including *νῆος*, speech, and skill in poetry. Elsewhere (*Nem.* 7.17–18, *Isth.* 2.12) a preference for fame over more immediate goods is called *σοφία* and its possessor *σοφός*, evidently in parallel with *προμάθεια*. For the interpretation of *σοφός* in the second passage, see my remarks in *TAPA* 99 (1968) 541–42. But *σοφία* is used also of lesser skills that aim at lesser profits, as the physician Asclepius was led to act wrongfully for the sake of money (*Pyth.* 3.54). At *Isth.* 3.1–3 success in the games, or in the use of wealth, if combined with abstention from *κόρος*, is held to be deserving of praise. At *Nem.* 7.17–20 a *σοφία* with regard to the future that is uncorrupted by *κέρδος* is, by implication, held to be relevant to death.

⁴² Cf., with Bundy 57, the similar passage at *Isth.* 5.24–32.

χρή νιν εὐρόντεσσιν ἀγάνορα κόμπουν
 μὴ φθονεραῖσι φέρειν
 γνῶμαις. ἐπεὶ κούφα δόσις ἀνδρὶ σοφῶ
 ἀντὶ μόχθων παντοδαπῶν ἔπος εἰ-
 πόντ' ἀγαθὸν ξυνὸν ὀρθῶσαι καλόν.

The traditional interpretation, which was offered by Aristarchus in antiquity and by Dissen in modern times, has νιν refer to ἀρετᾶ two lines earlier, understands εὐρόντεσσιν to govern it, and takes the phrase as a generalised reference to the unspecified subject of κατὰκειται above.⁴³ The view of Didymus, that εὐρόντεσσιν ἀγάνορα κόμπουν refers to those who give praise to victors and is the subject of φέρειν, is commonly rejected as un-Pindaric because elsewhere Pindar always uses the accusative with χρή. εὐρίσκω is taken to have the meaning that it exhibits in *Ol.* 7.89 ἄνδρα τε πῦξ ἀρετὰν εὐρόντα and elsewhere, and φέρειν means, more or less, “give,” which then is appropriately echoed by δόσις in the next sentence. The construction is illustrated by Bowra’s rendering: “To those who have found it we should pay / A proud song of praise with ungrudging temper.”

Mezger, however, who is followed by Bury, accepted the construction of Didymus, making νιν the object of φέρειν and taking εὐρίσκω to describe the act of the poet, as in *Ol.* 3.4 νεοσίγαλον εὐρόντα τρόπον and elsewhere, and understanding φέρειν of the exaltation of victory by song, as in the image at 64–65. Bury translated as follows: “It is meet for men, if they have discovered a magnificent fashion of praise, to bear him up thereon with no ungenerous sentiments.”⁴⁴

More recently E. Thummer has proposed a new sense for the traditional construction. Finding in κατὰκειται the meaning, “exhausted” or “prostrated,” he renders: “Dann muss man ihn mit neidloser Gesinnung jenen bringen, die ein herrliches Loblied erfanden.” The exhausted victor must be brought to the poet as to a physician, who can give him relief from his pains. The image that the reader is invited to contemplate appears to be that of a victor in a state of collapse who is carried by a *kōmos* of friends to receive help and restoration from the poet.

Most recently G. A. Privitera has put forward yet another construction. He has νιν refer to the unexpressed subject of κατὰκειται and εὐρόντεσσιν ἀγάνορα κόμπουν to glorified victors and heroes, while taking the dative to be governed by φέρει as in *Pyth.* 4.216 (ὄρνιν Κυπρογένεια φέρειν πρῶτον

⁴³ See Bundy 58. The shift from the singular of the protasis to the plural of the apodosis is not a difficulty in Greek: see Thummer 2.25.

⁴⁴ E. des Places, *Le pronom chez Pindare* (Paris 1947) 29, takes νιν proleptically, anticipating the following κόμπουν, and properly repudiates Bury’s assumption that φέρειν here is synonymous with βαστάσαι (“raise up”) at *Isth.* 3.8. He renders: “il faut, quand on a trouvé une noble louange, la (lui) porter d’un cœur qui ne lésine pas.” But the prolepsis is bold and the sense yielded by νιν φέρειν is, on this interpretation, weak.

ἀνθρώποισι). He renders: “bisogna portarlo tra coloro che hanno trovato una magnifica lode.”

Didymus’ construction, and with it the interpretation of Mezger and Bury, must be rejected, partly for lack of parallels to the use of the dative with *χρή*, partly also because it attributes to Pindar the unfamiliar idea that praise is owed to the virtues of the athlete rather than to his victory. We may doubt also whether *φέρειν γνώμῃς* can signify the exaltation of poetry, in the way in which this is clearly signified by *εὐφώνων πτερύγεσσιν ἀερόντ’ ἀγλααῖς Πιερίδων* (64–65).

The lack of parallels is a difficulty for any available rendering of *κατάκειται*, and this cannot be in itself a decisive objection to Thummer’s interpretation. If it is conceded that the word might possibly signify the physical collapse of a victor, we are then left in some doubt what *ἀρετᾷ κατάκειται* might mean. Since Thummer takes *ἀρετᾷ* and *δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις* as instrumental datives with *κατάκειται*, denies that Pindar speaks here of the victor’s endeavours of perseverance and will, insists that *ὄργᾳ* is an affection (*Affekt*, *Gemüt*, apparently “mood”), and translates, “Wenn er sich aber auf Erfolg niedergelassen hat in seinem ganzen Gemüt,” one infers that he intends something like “he suffers a collapse of all his spirits as a result of his victory and the expenditure of effort and money that preceded.” Whatever we make of sense and syntax, the image is strong and the notion of the poet as healer is Pindaric, as Thummer shows, but I cannot find that the interpretation is happy. The collapse of the victor, his being carried off the field by friends, and his presentation to the poet for restoration, all seem un-Pindaric and a failure precisely of *τόλμα*. Nor can I believe that Pindar might have compared the occasion of celebration with the function of a first-aid station.

The defect in Privitera’s interpretation is of a similar kind. The image of transporting the victor “with ungrudging will” *into the company of the glorious* is not one used by Pindar for the praise of his victors. On the other hand, parallels such as *Nem.* 3.28 (*Αἰακῶ σε φάμι γένει τε Μοῖσαν φέρειν*) encourage us to think that here too the poet speaks of bringing praise to those who deserve it rather than of bringing the victor to those who have received it. And as it is in the *kōmos* that the victor is “given a hand” (*βαστάσαι*) with winning songs (*Isth.* 3.8), it seems probable that the support that is promised to him in our passage also is just the encomiastic praise of his kinsmen and friends, and not a translation into the company of the most praised.

If then the traditional interpretation is best, it is necessary to take note of a pause or hesitation at the end of 42, where B. Snell inserted a dash. For the conditional clause speaks only of dispositions and of physical and financial effort, whereas the main clause has to do with something different, the praise of the victory that is gained by their means. The shift of focus from will and effort to achievement is small but significant, and the

point is well caught by the version of Sandys: "tis meet that, *when the prize is won*, we should, with thoughts ungrudging, give him ennobling praise." If the poet had said, "if the victor wins by his whole-hearted commitment," his conclusion would follow naturally, but he would have laid his emphasis on the victory rather than on the virtues. If he had omitted *νῦν εὐρόντεσσιν* from the apodosis, he would have proclaimed a duty to praise moral and physical effort, apart from the victory. The second would have been inappropriate both to the *genre* and to the occasion; the first was not to the poet's purpose in this ode. It is taken for granted in an epinician ode that it is the victory that deserves and requires praise and Pindar acknowledges this condition by the insertion of the short phrase at the beginning of his apodosis, but this done, he wishes his emphasis here to fall on the victor's virtues.

The absence of a subject in 43–44 left unspecified upon whom the obligation of praise rested. The hearers of the poem, as participants in a festival of celebration, think vaguely of themselves, and of all who are present to honour the victor. But this leaves room for the entrance of the poet, whose peculiar function is praise. He offers an assurance, which the audience finds confirmed by the progress of the song, that the obligation will be honoured. "(That praise is forthcoming,) for it is an easy gift for a man of skill, by pronouncing a good word in return for a victor's many pains endured, to raise up his glory in the sight of all."⁴⁵

There follows a finely-crafted passage, which is an example of a form, called "Priamel" by German scholars, that recurs in the odes.⁴⁶ We have a graded progression, beginning with a diversifying generalisation concerning the payment (*μισθός*) of various forms of labour (implying *πόνοι*), with examples of these; then a new unifying generalisation specifying the pursuit of a livelihood as the motive of all mankind; finally and climactically, in contrast with the preceding, the praise of praise itself, when received from fellow-citizens and foreigners alike, as the highest profit.⁴⁷

ἐπεὶ κούφα δόσις ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ
ἀντὶ μόχθων παντοδαπῶν ἔπος εἰ-
πόντ' ἀγαθὸν ξυνὸν ὀρθῶσαι καλόν.

⁴⁵ The formal conventions of the passage (with many parallels) are surveyed by Bundy 61–62 and by Thummer 2.26–27. Privitera 119–20 wishes to make *ἔπος* the object both of *εἰπόντ'* and of *ὀρθῶσαι* and to take *καλόν* and *ξυνόν* as predicatives, "esprimendo un giudizio in senso buono, elevare il commune giudizio in forma bella." Cf. however Bundy 65.

⁴⁶ On the Priamel, see Bundy, *Studia Pindarica 1: The Eleventh Olympian Ode* (1962) 5–10, and Thummer 2.27–29.

⁴⁷ See my discussion of the passage in *TAPA* 108 (1978) 296–97 and of true profit in *TAPA* 99 (1968) 537–39. Corresponding with the discrimination among various forms of profit here is Pindar's implicit discrimination elsewhere among various forms of *σοφία* in regard to profit: see note 41 above.

μισθὸς γὰρ ἄλλοις ἄλλος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώποις γλυκὺς,
μηλοβότα τ' ἀρότα τ' ὀρ-
νιχολόχῳ τε καὶ δν πόντος τράφει.
γαστρὶ δὲ πᾶς τις ἀμύνων λιμὸν αἰανῇ τέταται·
50 ὅς δ' ἀμφ' ἀέθλοισι ἢ πολεμίζων ἄρηται
κῦδος ἄβρόν,
εὐαγορηθεὶς κέρδος ὕψιστον δέκεται, πολιατᾶν
καὶ ξένων γλώσσας ἄωτον.

The whole passage is designed to give emphasis to its climactic point, which is praise as the highest profit. Structurally, this point links on to 46 and the topic of praise in return for pains endured, and it will make a transition to the victory-catalogue that is to follow immediately. In the larger context of the second half of the poem it is important because it proclaims with eloquence the truth that is grasped by the *noos*, by whose guidance, it was said in 40, the man who has been able to endure *πόντοι* is able to produce even forethought. Forethought is precisely the disposition of the man who, having seen this truth, directs his life, and particularly his expenditures, to the end of praise and commemoration. That man resembles the generous and munificent Croesus, whose excellence, Pindar reminds Hieron at the end of the First Pythian (89–94), does not perish but is declared to tellers of tales and singers of songs by the raised voice of fame among men who come afterwards. There it is magnificent expenditure that is recommended and praised, and the theme occurs elsewhere in Pindar.

The theme of the victor's virtues thus reaches its culmination in the praise of praise, for the former rests just on the apprehension of the truth proclaimed by the latter. But the occasion is the celebration of a victory, the *genre* is epinician, and the victories, for which we have been preparing since 43, must be given due prominence, and a list of them accordingly follows. It begins appropriately with *ἄμμι δ' εἵκει*, which picks up the *χρῆ* of 43. This time the subject is made explicit, but in both passages it is general. "It is appropriate for us" as the singers of the song, and for all who are present, and are thought to take part in the ceremonies of celebration. It is not only the wise poet who is concerned, important as he may be; it is the praise pronounced by the utterance of fellow-citizens and strangers that is the highest profit, and it is this that the performance of Pindar's ode during the celebration at Thebes, in the presence and with the consent of all the *philoî* and the *agathoi*, ratifies and makes manifest. In Greek society every judgment, if it is to have authority, must be pronounced aloud in public by the *ἔννομος λόγος ἀνθρώπων* (*Pyth.* 1.68) and it is this function, that of public judgment, that the act of celebration performs.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Cf. the discussion of the importance of public judgments in the Pindaric society in *TAPA* 108 (1978) 298–99.

The catalogue comes to an end with a wish for future victories at Delphi and Olympia and concludes with a fillip that has had rough handling from the commentators (67–68):

εἰ δέ τις ἔνδον νέμει πλοῦ-
τον κρυφαῖον,
ἄλλοισι δ' ἐμπίπτων γελᾶ, ψυχὰν Ἀΐδα τελέων οὐ
φράζεται δόξας ἀνευθεν.

ἐμπίπτω, “to fall upon,” is a violent word in Pindar and seems never to occur elsewhere of merely verbal abuse.⁴⁹ It is true nevertheless that the Scholiast, who had Greek in his bones, was willing to offer the paraphrase, ἐπεμβαίνων καταγελᾶ, “he derides offensively” or “assails with derision,” which gives a vigorous, if unparalleled, sense.

The attempts that have been made to avoid this sense cannot be thought happy. Dissen suggested *insultans ridet, sibi placet insultans*, in order to preserve the priorities of finite verb and participle. But the point is too finicky. Pindar himself says (*Pyth.* 10.36) γελᾶ θ' ὀρώων ὕβριν ὀρθίαν κνωδάλων and Herodotus (4.36.2) has γελῶ δὲ ὀρώων γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη καὶ οὐδένα νόον ἐχόντως ἐξηγησάμενον. The meaning is that Apollo laughs when he looks at the asses of the Hyperboreans, just as the historian laughs when he looks at the maps of the Ionians. The passages do not mean, “I take pleasure in the act of looking at them.” Bury believes that “when the hoarder falls in with ‘other men’ . . . he laughs at the thought of their folly . . .,” and he is followed by Farnell and others. This is to avoid one unparalleled meaning by taking refuge in another, for LSJ do not recognise “to fall in with another person.” Bury also betrays the influence of Dissen’s over-subtle interpretation by his “laughs at the thought,” for Pindar himself says nothing to this effect. Norwood proposed, “(he) laughs at others while he embraces it (sc. wealth).” This ascribes a doubtful sense to the participle, while weakening the phrase by multiplying its objects. Bundy (85), after a careful comparison of parallel occurrences of the formal motifs that he recognises in the passage, finds here both encouragement and praise of the victor, with a warning against hoarding his wealth, “taking pleasure in the lot of others less fortunate than himself.” The warning is evidently against ἐπιχαίρε-κακία, but that is, as the name indicates, a taking pleasure *in the troubles* of others (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.9.4–5: 1386b), not derision of others *per se*, of which Pindar appears to speak here. Nor does a warning against this fault seem characteristic of the poet, who, though he frequently repudiates envy, is not accustomed to find it in his victors, even by implication. It is true that Democritus (fr. B191 VS) is able to recommend attention to the state of those less fortunate than oneself as an exercise in εὐθυμία, but this

⁴⁹ See Slater, *Lex. Pind.* s.v., and cf. passages like Hdt. 3.81.2 and Aesch. *Agam.* 1300.

idea also seems un-Pindaric, and a recommendation against the victor's schooling himself to be cheerful is not in place at the end of the ode of celebration.

Thummer takes the verse to be the opposite of *Pyth.* 8.81–82: *τέτρασι δ' ἔμπετες ὑψόθεν / σωμάτεσσι κακὰ φρονέων*. “Wer in Kampfe mit anderen lacht, d.h. wer nicht ernsthaft kämpft.” *γελᾷ* . . . , as the reverse of *κακὰ φρονέων*, betrays the man's lack of seriousness in competition. As one who refuses to spend and shows himself only a frivolous competitor, he is the opposite of the man praised in 41–42, who gave his all. Though the manipulation of the theme is neat, I find the proposed use of *γελᾶν* most unlikely for Pindar, and the image weak and trivial.

The meaning of *νέμει* is less disputed. Bury assumed that *νέμειν πλοῦτον* must mean, “to dispense wealth,” and accordingly found a figurative sense in “he dispenses wealth at home,” as the equivalent of not dispensing it at all.⁵⁰ As Farnell objected, this is not likely for Pindar; it may be added that it introduces an uncharacteristic irony as well. Farnell himself proposed “herding,” Sandys “broodeth,” and Norwood “hoards,” while Bundy favoured a version such as “keeps concealed and enjoys.” These are preferable and give an improved image and tone. But it may well be that LSJ, Lattimore, and Slater are correct in offering a less specific sense, “possess,” “keep,” “have in his care.”⁵¹

Pindar the epinician poet is in no doubt about the value of wealth.⁵² It is valuable, not economically or socially or even personally, but in its public use for the winning and celebration of victories. Hoarding or mere accumulation is therefore reprobated and the magnificent use of money commended. *δαπάνη*, as we saw, is a necessary condition of victory and the fame that is its end (41 ff.), and there is a highest profit that is the culmination of “pay” (47–51). It must be this idea that is picked up again, in its reverse form, at the end of the poem.

The man who keeps his wealth at home in his private charge must be the opposite, as Thummer states (2.34), of the man (41–42) who puts everything into competition. What then does it mean to say that he assails others (unlike himself) with derision? Thummer's comment is pertinent: “Dass man durch die Verspottung anderer keinen Ruhm gewinnen kann ist ein wahrhaft plumper Gedanke.” To meet his judgment fully would require more space than is available here, but a counter-statement may be sketched.

⁵⁰ Bowra 144–45 with note on 67–68 and Thummer 2.34 appear to find a similar sense.

⁵¹ W. J. Slater in *CJ* 72 (1977) 199 and note 34 finds here an unrecognised “Pythagorean precept.” He cites in support of his suggestion Verg. *Aen.* 610 (*qui divitiis soli incubuere repertis*), A. Dieterich, *Nekyia* (Berlin 1913²) 168, and R. Merkelbach in *MH* 8 (1951) 7, lines 6–8 = *Pap. Bon.* 4.2.12 ed. Montevicchi (Milan 1953) p. 12.

⁵² For Pindar's view of wealth see note 39 above. Cf. Bacch. 3.10–13, Democr. fr. B282 and Gorg. fr. B20 VS.

Pindar sees society as a cockpit in which praise is matched against blame.⁵³ As an epinician poet, he is enrolled among the forces of praise and opposed to those of blame. He presents this conflict often, perhaps most fully in the difficult epilogue of the Second Pythian. His message there, as elsewhere (*Ol.* 1.53), is that ill-speaking cannot prosper and he contemplates with horror the fate of the fault-finding Archilochus, who had only his enmities to fatten himself upon (*Pyth.* 2.54–56). In the context of the First Isthmian, it is just the highest profit that a man puts beyond his grasp, if he refuses to take part in the praise-generating activities of competition and celebration, for he debars himself thereby from future fame.

In this conflict laughter is likely to take a sharp edge, as in the derisive poems of “fault-finding Archilochus.” We can form some idea of its nature by noticing the fear that Hesiod and Semonides display concerning the laughter of the neighbours or Medea’s pathological response to the laughter of her enemies. Pindar himself gives us an insight, toward the end of the Eighth Pythian (81–87), into this kind of laughter in an agonistic context. The passage describes pungently the return home of defeated athletes. They are welcomed, he says, with no pleasant laughter, and it is a ready inference that the laughter that greets them is different indeed. For their return they avoid the public streets, preferring the back-alleys, where they cringe out of sight of their enemies, torn by the pain of defeat. It is a picture of blame, the reverse of praise, at its work.⁵⁴

We do not know whether all who competed in the great games had to bear a burden of derision coming from those who stood outside the circle of the *agathoi*.⁵⁵ At an earlier time the criticism of athletic values by an intellectual poet like Xenophanes is familiar, at a somewhat later date at Athens we find an echo of this judgment in Euripides, we have some sense from Thucydides and Plutarch of the public reaction to the extravagant scale on which Alcibiades competed in the great games, and we discover in Plato’s *Lysis* some gentle amusement concerning a lover’s praise of a boy’s romantic enthusiasm for the value of competition.⁵⁶ Perhaps there were always some who, from prejudices of class, calling, or culture, heaped ridicule on the competitors. Whatever the truth may be in this regard, we may be sure that, in Greek society, any error or misfortune was certain to bring down a storm of ridicule and obloquy, as upon the unfortunate boys in the Pythian ode.

⁵³ See note 48 above.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Ol.* 8.67–69.

⁵⁵ Cf. the discussion in Bowra, *Pindar* (above, note 6) 185 ff.

⁵⁶ See Xenoph. fr. B2 VS, Eur. fr. 282 Nauck², Thuc. 6.16.2, Plut. *Alcib.* 11, Plato, *Lys.* 205c,d.

A few lines earlier in the First Isthmian, as Pindar approached the end of his catalogue of victories, he had checked himself, first by recollecting the brevity of his poem, then by the suggestive reflection that "often silence yields a greater joy" (than proclamation).⁵⁷ We do not know, and cannot now discover, any failure or setback in Herodotus' career as a competitor, but the parallels in Pindar may at least suggest that one such is here suppressed. If so, the victor had given a hostage to detraction and ridicule, and in that case, Pindar's comment at the end of the poem may refer to this situation.

If we see that laughter here is an expression, not merely of personal amusement,⁵⁸ but of a judgment concerning a whole society and its values, we shall be able to meet Thummer's difficulty. For the man who derides the activities, and especially the failures, of the competitive society divests himself of all hope of the greatest value which that society could offer to those who belonged to it, the undying fame of their names.

Such a man then, from the point of view of a defender of the society, is defective precisely in forethought.⁵⁹ He is the reverse side of the man praised in 41 ff. At the end of his poem Pindar abandons his theme of the victories in order to return to the victor's virtues. He does something similar with the theme of Neoptolemus at the end of the Seventh Nemean, with a reverse flourish in both passages.

⁵⁷ See note 8 above. Pindar speaks of suppression particularly in referring to the gods or heroes (*Ol.* 9.103, *Nem.* 5.16–18, fr. 81 Snell-Maehler), but the rule of prudence applies just as much to relations with men as to those with gods (fr. 180).

⁵⁸ However Farnell 2.341 finds that "Pindar is obviously thinking of a certain individual in Thebes who mocks at Herodotus for spending his money on chariot-racing." Bundy 84–85 argues for reference to a type.

⁵⁹ Note the association of *προμάθεια* with profit at *Nem.* 11.44–48.